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It  is  widely  recognized  that  entrepreneurial  activity  plays  an  important  role  in  promoting  new 
product innovation, discovering new markets, and replacing inefficient incumbents in a process 
called  “creative  destruction”,  all  of which  enhance  economic  growth.  Given  the  importance  of 
entrepreneurship and small business enterprises it is not surprising that policy makers worldwide 
(and especially in Europe) try to stimulate entrepreneurial activity. One public policy, frequently 
discussed, is how to design tax policies that stimulate start ups and entrepreneurship. 
Existing knowledge about taxes’ effect on entrepreneurial activity and start ups is relatively 
limited, however. Existing empirical studies are primarily based on US data and have until recently 
used aggregated tax measures (e.g., average national tax rates) or hypothetical marginal tax rates 
and time series or cross section data. 
This  study,  however,  uses  a  particular  rich  longitudinal  micro level  dataset  based  on 
Swedish tax return information, which makes it possible to track a cohort of individuals over time 
periods during which tax rate changes took place, and thereby isolate whether real life individual 
decisions about self employment are affected by changes in the tax rates they actually face. In 
addition, as the tax structure in Sweden is neutral as opposed to the US that encourages risk taking 
and tax driven self employment, studying the effect of income taxes on the probability to become 
self employed based on Swedish data provides information about how taxes on self employment 
affect  self employment.  Contrary  to  earlier  studies  based  on  US  data,  I  find  both  average  and 




JEL classification: H24; J24, H26   2 
1. Introduction 
It is becoming increasingly recognized that entrepreneurial activity plays a vital role for economic 
growth  and  welfare.  By  promoting  new  product  innovation,  discovering  new  markets,  and 
replacing  inefficient  incumbents  in  a  process  known  as  “creative  destruction”  entrepreneurship 
enhance economic growth and employment. Entrepreneurship is especially valuable in a knowledge 
economy, as it serves as a mechanism that transforms existing knowledge into commercialized 
products and economic growth (Audretsch, 2004). Moreover, entrepreneurs and small firm creation 
will  likely  become  even  more  important  for  creating  employment  opportunities  in  a  global 
economy, where large firms increasingly choose to outsource and offshore to low cost countries, 
and as the technological development process continues. 
  Given the importance of entrepreneurship, economists have long studied what factors are 
important for creating and maintaining entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Schumpter, 1934 and Murphy 
et al., 1991). Despite this, the profession is still far from understanding what drives individuals to 
become entrepreneurs, even though individual characteristics (such as age, education, and assets) 
and economic and social environments (such as macro economic environment and institutional 
setup) have been found to be important (Giannetti & Simonov, 2004). 
Interestingly,  relatively  few  studies  have  considered  taxation  even  though  taxes  are 
important both for the return to entrepreneurial activity and individuals’ propensity to take risks and 
therefore likely influence entrepreneurship. As the effects of taxation on entrepreneurial activity is 
theoretically ambiguous – discouraging it by reducing the net return to successful entrepreneurship 
but also  encouraging  risk taking  by  allowing loss offsetting  – is it  up  to empirical  analysis to 
determine the net effect of taxation on entrepreneurial activity. Existing empirical studies (most of 
them based on US or British data) have until recently used aggregated tax measures (e.g., average 
national tax rates) or hypothetical marginal tax rates and time series or cross section data. Recently, 
research  has  transitioned  to  the  use  of  longitudinal  micro level  databases,  which  enables 
researchers to track a cohort of individuals over time periods during which tax rate changes took 
place, and thereby isolate how real life individual decisions about employment status are affected 
by changes in the tax rates they actually face. Both the earlier and the more recent studies have 
been inclined to find a positive correlation between income taxes and entrepreneurship based on US 
data.   3 
Empirical  studies  have  almost  exclusively  used  self employment  as  a  proxy  for 
entrepreneurship. Even though there is no single accepted definition of what an entrepreneur is, it is 
generally thought of as somebody who is innovative, possess a want for their business venture to 
grow, and operates under uncertainty.
1 As it is  hard to  measure such  activities, it has become 
standard in the literature to use self employment as a proxy for entrepreneurial activity. This clearly 
has its shortcomings, however. For instance, employed individuals can be innovative, operate under 
risk, and possess a willingness for their business venture to grow and, hence, fit the description of 
entrepreneurs (the so called intrapreneurs) and many individuals who are self employed may not fit 
the description of entrepreneurs (e.g., being innovative and operate under uncertainty) but instead 
be  driven  into  self employment  for  necessity  reasons.  Using  self employment  as  a  measure  of 
entrepreneurial activity may, hence, both understate and overstate the amount of entrepreneurial 
activity that takes place. 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  by  examining  how  income  taxation  in  Sweden 
affects the propensity to become self employed. An important feature of the Swedish tax system is 
to tax all forms of income neutrally implying that income from self employment is taxed as income 
from employment. Potential losses are generally deductible against future gains and can only the 
first years and up to a fairly low amount be credited against labor income. In the US, on the other 
hand, the tax system treats gains and losses asymmetrically permitting self employed to deduct 
losses against highly taxed labor income while taxing profits at a low corporate tax rate. The US tax 
structure encourages risk taking and tax driven self employment and it is, hence, not surprising that 
an  increase  in  the  income  tax  encourages  self employment  as  it  makes  loss offsetting  more 
valuable while not affecting net gains as the profits are taxed as corporate income. A study based 
on a neutral tax system (like the Swedish), hence, analyzes how taxation of self-employment affects 
the propensity to become self employed. The same study, based on the US tax system does not test 
how taxation of self employment affects the propensity to become self employed but rather how 
the tax advantage of being self employed increases with income taxes. 
In addition, the data available in Sweden is particularly rich and suitable for a study of how 
taxes  affect  the  propensity  to  become  self employed.  Specifically,  the  data  used  in  this  paper, 
Longitudinal  Individual  Database  (LINDA),  contain  detailed  tax return  information  for  over 
                                                 
1 An important distinction between an entrepreneur that is self employed and an employee is that the latter’s return is 
known and always positive, the return to the self employed entrepreneur consists of the residual that is left when all 
payments are made and is, hence, unknown and can be negative (Bjuggren et al. (2007)).    4 
300,000 individuals that are followed over a long time period, and include a broad set of socio 
economic and demographic variables known to affect self employment. LINDA, hence, provides 
the data necessary to estimate statistically how the probability to become self employed is affected 
by  income  taxes  while  simultaneously  controlling  for  important  additional  determinants. 
Specifically,  I use  random  effects  probit techniques  to identify  the  effect  of  tax policy  on  the 
likelihood that individuals will become self employed taking into account such determinants as 
income, wealth, demographic characteristics as well as taxes. I use the time period between 1985 
and 2000 and the tax rate changes that occurred during this period to estimate how average and 
marginal taxes influence the propensity to become self employed. 
This study finds, contrary to most previous studies based on US data, that income taxes 
negatively influence the propensity to become self employed. Differences in tax structure can most 
likely explain why taxes in Sweden have a negative impact on self employment while a positive 
impact in the US. The Swedish tax law provides less generous loss offsettings, making it more 
costly to fail in Sweden than in the US and at the same time tax gains at high rates making the net 
return lower. 
The paper is organized as follow. The next section provides a short discussion of some key 
studies analyzing the effect of taxes on self employment. Section 3 presents the data. In section 4 
the effect taxes have on the likelihood to become self employed is estimated. Finally, section 5 
performs some sensitivity analysis and discusses the results while section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Earlier empirical studies 
While there is a large body of empirical work trying to determine factors influencing individuals to 
become self employed, studies incorporating taxes have until recently been relatively rare. A factor 
that is well studied and that has consistently been found to positively impact entrepreneurship or 
self employment is access to own capital (e.g., Evans & Leighton, 1989, Evans & Jovanovic, 1989, 
Holtz Eakin et al., 1994, Johansson, 2000, Nykvist, 2005). 
Theoretically, the effect of taxes on self employment is ambiguous. On the one hand, high 
taxes reduce the expected return from undertaking risky self employment projects and the extra 
effort associated with being self employed implying a negative correlation between taxes and self 
employment. On the other hand, high taxes may stimulate self employment as high taxes provide 
incentives to underreport and reclassify taxable income in order to avoid taxation, something that is   5 
done more easily for self employed than for employees. In addition, high taxes may encourage risk 
taking if loss offsets are  granted as the  government then shares the risk (Domar &  Musgrave, 
1944). 
As the effect is theoretically ambiguous it is, thus, up to empirical analysis to determine the 
effect of income taxation on self employment. Empirical studies on the possible impact of taxes on 
self employment have been relatively rare, however. Table 1 summarizes the results from some 
earlier  studies.  The  work  done  can  roughly  be  divided  into  two  categories.  The  first  category 
consists of primarily earlier studies using time series or cross sectional data analysis and typically 
some aggregate tax measures (e.g., average national tax rates) or hypothetical marginal tax rates to 
study  how  these  affect  self employment  rates.  These  studies  have  almost  exclusively  found  a 
positive relationship between marginal income taxes and the level of self employment in primarily 
the US (e.g., Long, 1982a, 1982b, Moore, 1983, Blau, 1987, Parker, 1996, and Parker & Robson, 
2003).
2 A few more recent studies have, however, failed to confirm a positive correlation (e.g., 
Fairlie & Meyer, 2000 and Parker, 2003) or obtained a negative correlation (Briscoe et al., 2000, 
Fölster, 2002, and Bruce & Mohsin, 2006). These are rather exceptions, though, and have typically 
studied  a  specific  industry  or  a  non US  country.  Briscoe  et  al.,  for  example,  found  that  tax 
advantages  for  the  self employed  in  the  manufacturing  industry  positively  impacted  self 
employment  in  the  manufacturing  industry  in  England.  Fölster observed  a  negative  correlation 
between income taxes and self employment in Swedish counties. Bruce & Mohsin’s study is based 
on  US  data  and  indicates  a  statistically  significant  negative  impact  of  income  taxes  on  self 
employment, but the effect is quantitatively small and sensitive to model assumptions. 
A  few  studies  have  analyzed  how both  marginal  and  average  income  taxes affect  self 
employment.  Robson (1998),  for  instance,  studied  whether  income  taxes  can explain  the  rapid 
growth in self employment during the 1980’s in England. He found a positive correlation between 
average taxes and self employment but failed to find any correlation between marginal income 
taxes and self employment. Robson & Wren (1999) tried to explain why average and marginal 
income taxes have different effects on self employment. They argued that high marginal taxes 
affect  self employment  negatively  by  reducing  the  return  to  entrepreneurial  effort  while  high 
average  taxes  affect  self employment  positively  by  making  tax  planning  and  avoidance  more 
attractive, something they also found empirical support for. 
                                                 
2 One of the studies (Parker, 1996) is based on British data and one (Parker & Robson, 2003) on OECD data.   6 
The second category  consists of more recent studies based on repeated cross section or 
longitudinal  micro level  data,  and  have  typically  estimated  the  effect  of  taxes  on  individuals’ 
probability  to  become  self employed.  The  latter  data  enable  researchers  to  track  a  cohort  of 
individuals over time periods during which tax rate changes took place, and thereby isolate how 
real life individual decisions about self employment are affected by changes in the tax rates they 
actually face and are better suited for these types of studies. One problem that previous studies have 
failed to address in an appropriate manner is the endogeneity problem; that is, the problem that 
income taxes affect the choice to become self employed but the choice to become self employed 
also affects taxes. Panel studies where individuals are followed over time are more successful in 
addressing these problems (Meyer, 1990). The access to better data has resulted in a large number 
of new studies, and the results from these tend to confirm earlier results of a positive correlation 
between marginal income taxes and self employment (e.g., Schuetze, 2000, Bruce, 2000 & 2002, 
and Cullen & Gordon, 2002). The positive correlation has, however, been questioned by some. 
Gentry & Hubbard (2003), for example, obtained no statistically significant correlation between the 
level of the marginal tax rate and the propensity to become self employed in the US while Gentry 
& Hubbard (2004) found a negative relationship. In addition, Moore (2003) observed that both the 
marginal and average income taxes affect the probability to become self employed negatively. 
More recently, researchers have widened their perspective to not only analyze how the level 
of marginal and average income taxes affects the propensity to become self employed but how the 
tax structure affects the propensity to become self employed. This is important as it is not only the 
level of taxation but the progressivity of the tax structure and how self employment income is taxed 
relative to other income sources that influence the probability to become self employed. Gentry & 
Hubbard (2003 & 2004) have, for instance, studied how the progressivity in the tax code affects 
individuals’ probability to become self employed. They find that tax progressivity, measured as the 
difference in the marginal tax rate of succeeding and failing, negatively influence the decision to 
become self employed. 
Moreover,  Cullen  &  Gordon  (2007)  have  recently  developed  a  model  illustrating  the 
importance of the tax structure. More specifically, they model how the tax structure influences risk 
taking  and,  hence,  self employment  (or  entrepreneurship)  in  three  ways.  The  first  mechanism, 
income shifting, captures to what extent the tax structure provides incentives to shift income from 
one form to another, e.g., from highly taxes labor income to low taxed corporate income. How   7 
large this effect is depends on the tax structure. The self employed in the US have large means to 
shift  income  as  they  ex post  can  choose  whether  they  want  to  be  taxed  as  employees  or  as 
corporations. Self employed with business losses have incentives to be taxed as employees and 
deduct losses against highly taxed labor income while self employed with gains have incentives to 
be taxed as businesses and take advantage of the low corporate income tax rate (currently, the 
lowest rate is 15 percent). In Sweden, however, the means to lower the tax burden by shifting 
income  is  restricted  by  special  tax  laws  (the  so called  3:12  rules  or  rules  for  closely  held 
companies) that are designed to prevent this problem.  
The second mechanism, risk subsidizing, measures how the tax structure encourages risk 
taking. In a proportional tax system taxes are neutral. Risk taking is discouraged in a progressive 
tax  system  without  means  to  incorporate,  however,  as  successful  entrepreneurship  is  taxed 
relatively hard in a progressive tax system. A progressive tax system that allows incorporation (that 
is, gains can be taxed at corporate tax rates) and losses to be deducted against highly taxed labor 
income, as is the case in the US, subsidizes risk taking. The US tax structure, hence, encourages 
risk taking and especially so for high income individuals that can deduct losses against high taxed 
labor income. The last mechanism reflects the government’s role as a risk sharer a’la Domar & 
Musgrave.  Again,  income  taxes  encourage  risk  taking  as  the  government’s  share  of  the  loss 
increases with the tax rate. 
It is, hence, not surprising that studies based on US data have found a positive relationship 
between income taxes and self employment. According to Cullen & Gordon’s (2007) model the 
income tax has an unambiguous positive effect on the probability to become self employed, as all 
three mechanisms encourage risk taking.  
It  is,  however,  unlikely  that  these  results  will  carry  over  to  Swedish  conditions  as  the 
Swedish  tax  structure  is  very  different  from  the  US.  As  already  mentioned,  the  Swedish  tax 
structure  is  less  risk  encouraging  with  limited  means  to  shift  income  and  less  generous  loss 
deduction rules. It is interesting for several reasons to conduct a study based on Swedish data.
3 
First, a study based on the Swedish tax structure is more suitable for estimating how taxes on self 
                                                 
3  To  my  knowledge  there  are  no  estimates  on  how  taxes  affect  self employment  based  on  Swedish  longitudinal 
individual based data. A study by Fölster (2002) based on aggregate data from Swedish counties finds that the average 
top income tax rate in the county is negatively correlated with self employment. Similarly, Backman (2007) found 
municipal  income  taxes  to  negatively  influence  start ups  in  Sweden.  Nyström  (2007),  however,  failed  to  find  a 
significant relationship between municipal taxes and start ups.   8 
employment affect the propensity to become self employed as self employed and employees are 
treated more uniformly in Sweden. 
Second, particularly rich and detailed data are available for Swedish taxpayers that may 
provide unique insights into the relationship between income tax rates and entrepreneurship. Unlike 
most previous studies, the data make it possible to track a large number of individual taxpayers 
over long time periods, and include detailed information about taxes, income, wealth, employment 
status, education, and many demographic variables making the data especially suitable to study the 
effect of taxation on self employment.  
 
3. The Data 
To study how taxes influence the occupational choice in Sweden I use data from the Longitudinell 
INdividDAtabas (LINDA), a longitudinal data set that has sampled 3 percent of the population 
each year since 1968 (SCB, 2003). It consists of a large panel of individuals, and their household 
members, and is selected to be representative for the whole population. The sampling procedure   
where individuals are replaced by a random sample of, for instance, newborns and immigrants   
ensures that each cross section of LINDA is representative for the population in a particular year 
(Edin and Fredriksson, 2000). The data come from detailed registers such as the income and wealth 
registers  and  population  census  data,  and  contain  highly  reliable  data  on  various  measures  of 
income, taxes, wealth, employment status as well as demographic information.  
In this paper, I follow the standard tradition and, hence, use self employment as a measure 
of entrepreneurial activity. It is, however, important to bear in mind that it in many ways is a poor 
measure for entrepreneurial activity. The self employment variable equals one if the individual 
receives at least half of their earned income from their business venture. Business ventures included 
are  sole  proprietorships,  trading  partners,  and  limited  partnerships  but  not  limited  liability 
companies. As 89 percent of all new start ups in Sweden are sole proprietorship (Cullen & Gordon, 
2006) this is a good proxy for start ups. 
I  include  individuals  with  valid  information  on  employment  status,  income,  taxes  and 
demographic variables from 1985 to 2000. This data have the advantage of being able to track the 
same  individuals  over  a  16  year  time  span  and  thereby  eliminate  some  of  the  problems  with 
endogeneity, and is rich enough to be able to control for many confounding factors. I restrict the 
sample to include individuals that are in their working age (20   65) each year. They are over   9 
75,000 observations for each year and a total of over 1,100,000 observations for the entire time 
period, although this number is reduced when education and other control variables are included.  
Table 2 shows some sample characteristics for self employed and employees, respectively. 
Over the entire time period, 1985 to 2000, 4.3 percent of those in the sample were self employed 
according to above definition. This number varied over the years, with a maximum value of 4.48 
percent in 1985 and a minimum of 3.86 percent during the economic crisis in 1992. As is apparent 
from  the  table,  self employed  had  a  lower  average  taxable  income  than  the  employed  (SEK 
131,240 compared to SEK 179,624) and paid a slightly lower average and marginal income tax rate 
(33 compared to 35 percent and 37 compared to 41 percent, respectively). Self employed have a 
considerable higher taxable wealth, however. The average taxable wealth of the self employed is 
almost 50 percent larger than the average taxable wealth of the employed individuals. One can 
speculate whether the substantially higher taxable wealth for the self employed is a consequence of 
higher returns to self employment or whether the wealth was initially higher, and maybe even a 
requirement for becoming self employed. As already mentioned, a substantial body of literature has 
found that access to own capital is an important determinant to become self employed (e.g., Evans 
& Leighton, 1989, Evans & Jovanovic, 1989, Holtz Eakin et al., 1994, Lind & Ohlsson, 1996, 
Blanchfloer & Oswald, 1998, Johansson, 2000, Davidsson & Henrekson, 2002, and Nykvist, 2005). 
The fact that reported taxable income is lower for self employed than employees could imply that 
wealth was not built up from the business venture. There can, however, be a large discrepancy 
between real income and reported taxable income, especially for self employed who have larger 
means  to  affect  their  taxable  income  (Persson,  2005,  and  Engström  &  Holmlund,  2006).  For 
instance, Engström & Holmlund estimate that self employed underestimate as much as 35 percent 
of their business income. If that is the case the average real income for self employed is larger than 
the average real income for employees (given that they have small means to affect their taxable 
income). The average yearly growth rate in taxable wealth among the self employed was lower 
than the average yearly growth rate in taxable wealth among employees, however, suggesting that 
the self employed had their wealth initially. 
In addition, self employed tend to be somewhat older than employees (44 compared to 40 
years), more likely to be male and married than female and unmarried. Self employed tend to have 
a lower level of education than employees, however. That self employed have a lower level of   10 
education than the employed seems to be the pattern prevailing in Europe, in the US, however the 
opposite is true (Blanchflower & Shadforth, 2007). 
 
4. Estimating the effect of taxes on the propensity to become self-employed 
To determine how taxes affect the propensity to become self employed I use the variation in tax 
rates that occurred between 1985 and 2000 to identify the tax effect. During this period several tax 
rate changes took place. For example, the top marginal tax rate was gradually lowered in the latter 
part of the 1980’s (from 80 percent in 1985 to 72 percent in 1990), then radically decreased to 50 
percent by the 1990/91 tax reform, then increased to 55 percent in 1995, in later parts of the 1990’s 
social  security  contributions  have  gradually  increased  providing  additional  increases  in  the  tax 
rates.  This,  together  with  bracket  creeps  will  likely  provide  enough  variation  in  average  and 
marginal tax rates to identify tax effects during this period and enable me to study how average and 
marginal tax rates affect the propensity to become self employed. The average tax rate is of interest 
as  it  determines  the  net  return  to  being  self employed  and  is  likely  to  affect  the  discrete 
occupational choice. The marginal tax rate, on the other hand, affects the return on the margin and 
may be harmful to successful entrepreneurship.
4  
To estimate the impact of taxes on the transition into self employment I follow the standard 
tradition and estimate the following random effects probit model: 
 
  + + + + ′ = + , , , , 1 , t i t i t i t i t i T X E ε τ   γ β    (2) 
 
where Ei,t+1 is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i moves from being an employee at 
time t to becoming self employed at time t+1, and zero if the individual remains an employee or 
self employed in both years. The Xi,t vector includes a constant term and a set of variables likely to 
affect the occupational choice, while Ti,t represents the individual specific average tax rate at time t. 
The  error  term  includes  an  individual  specific  time invariant  random  effect  ( i)  to  capture 
unobservable individual heterogeneity, an individual invariant time effect (τt), and an independent 
and identically distributed component (νi,t+1) with zero mean and finite variance.  
                                                 
4 The average and marginal tax rates are not reported in LINDA but can easily be calculated for each individual by the 
information provided in LINDA.   11 
In  addition  to  the  variables  of  interest,  the  tax  rates,  I  include  several  individual 
characteristics that have previously been found to affect the propensity to become self employed. 
For instance, as access to own capital has been found to be an important determinant for becoming 
self employed  I include taxable wealth  to  control  for  access  to  capital.  Ideally, total access to 
wealth would be included. Taxable wealth likely underestimates total wealth as it fails to include all 
kinds  of  assets  and  only include  wealth  above a  certain  threshold.  Unfortunately,  it  is hard to 
measure true wealth and taxable wealth is probably a better measure than many previous studies 
used for wealth. 
Moreover, I include age, age squared, whether the individual is married or not, and the 
individual’s level of education. Age can be seen as a proxy for risk aversion. Old tend to be more 
risk averse than young individuals but at a decreasing rate. I, hence, expect age to be negatively and 
age  squared  to  be  positively  correlated  with  the  propensity  to  become  self employed.  To  be 
married, measured as a dummy equal to one if the individual is married and zero otherwise, can 
affect the propensity to be self employed both negatively and positively. Positively if being married 
makes the individual more risk willing as he/she has a spouse to pool risks with. On the other hand, 
being married may make the individual less prone to take risks as the risk then not only affects the 
individual but potentially the family too. Education is represented by a variable between 1 and 7, 
where a 7 represents a graduate degree and 1 the lowest level of education.
5 
Previous labor income is included. This variable is expected to have a negative impact if it 
reflects the opportunity cost of becoming self employed and/or poor employment opportunities. 
The opposite relation is also feasible if high income individuals have greater potential to succeed 
with their business venture and, thus, more prone to become self employed. Moreover, as pointed 
out  by  Robson  (1998)  the  results  may  be  biased  if  individual  income  is  excluded.  To  further 
determine if individuals are pushed into self employment due to poor employment opportunities, I 
include  a  dummy  that  equals  one  if  the  individual  received  unemployment  benefits  two  years 
previously and zero otherwise. In addition, the amount of social benefits the individual receives two 
years previously is included. If individuals are pushed into self employment I expect these two 
variables to have a positive impact on the propensity to become self employed.  
                                                 
5 More specifically, 1 represents less than 9 years of schooling, 2 represents 9 years of schooling, 3 2 years of high 
school and 4 a high school degree of more than 2 years, 5 represents a collage degree shorter than 3 years while 6 
represents a collage degree of at least 3 years, and finally 7 represents a graduate degree.    12 
I  also  include  time  and  individual  specific  effects  to  control  for  time  invariant  and 
individual invariant factors that are hard to measure and quantify. It is, for instance, likely that the 
rules  and  bureaucracy  involved  with  starting  a  business  can  be  a  deterrent  of  becoming  self 
employed. To measure and quantify these factors are hard, however, but as long as these factors are 
constant to all individuals the time specific effects, τt, will control for these factors. The same goes 
for the macro economic environment and the institutional setting. The individual specific effects, 
 i, on the other hand, pick up the characteristics that are specific to the individual and constant over 
time. An individual’s risk propensity is an important factor for the occupational choice and as long 
as this is constant over time the individual specific effect controls for this effect. The age variable, 
on the other hand, picks up the change in the risk propensity over the life cycle. 
A  potentially  serious  issue  is  how  to  control  for  the  endogeneity  arising  because  an 
individual’s decision to move into self employment affects her/his tax rates. To control for this 
endogeneity I use the instrument variable approach suggested by Cummins et al. (1994) and later 
used by Carroll et al. (2000a, 2000b, 2001) and Bruce (2000, 2002). In this approach, a synthetic 
tax rate is computed for each time period by applying tax rules from year t+1 on income from year 
t inflated by inflation and real wage growth. The synthetic tax rate isolates the exogenous change in 
the tax rate from the behavioural response and represents the change in the tax law eliminating the 
effect of individuals’ behavioural response to tax rate changes. This tax rate is used in the transition 
regression. I alternatively, use the tax variable lagged two time periods back as an exogenous tax 
variable.  
  As I estimate the transition from being an employee in the first period to becoming self 
employed in the second period the individuals included in the sample must belong to either of those 
two categories, and, hence, I have a selected sample. Those who are self employed in both periods 
or  transitioned  out  of  self employment are  not included  in  the  sample.  The  individual  random 
effect, that captures unobservable entrepreneurial activity, may be correlated with the transition 
indicator, the so called initial conditions problem. To control for this bias I follow the method 
suggested by Orme (1997) and used, for instance, by Bruce (2000). This procedure converts the 
initial conditions problem to a more tractable sample selection problem. The first stage of this 
procedure is a probit regression of a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is initially 
observed as an employee and zero if the individual is initially observed as self employed. The 
included regressors in the first stage are individual characteristics observed in the initial year such   13 
as  age  and  age  squared,  sex,  and  county  of  residence.  For  this  procedure  to  be  appropriate 
individuals who are self employed in the initial year, 1985, must be omitted from the transition 
probits, leaving a sample with initially employed individuals who either remain employed, become 
self employed or drop out of the labor force. An inverted Mills ratio is calculated and included as a 
regressor in the random effects transition probit (equation 1). 
 
Results 
Table 3 reports the results from the regressions when average and marginal tax rates are employed 
without controlling for endogeneity. Estimations presented in columns Ia and Ib only control for 
tax rates and wealth while additional control variables are added in the estimations presented in the 
following columns. 
The  average  tax  rates  negatively  and  statistically  significantly  impact  the probability to 
become self employed in all specifications. Consistent with previous studies, access to wealth is 
positively and statistically significantly correlated with the probability to become self employed. 
As expected age is negatively and age squared positively correlated with the propensity to become 
self employed. Being married has a positive impact on the probability to become self employed 
suggesting that marriage works as a risk pooling device encouraging individuals to become self 
employed.  Consistent  with  other  studies  (e.g.,  Blanchflower  &  Shadforth,  2007),  education 
negatively  influence  the  probability  to  become  self employed,  although  this  relation  is  only 
statistically significant in one specification (IIa). Having been unemployed has a positive impact 
suggesting  that  unemployment  push  individuals  into  self employment  while  receiving  social 
benefits previously has an insignificant effect. Previous labor income has a negative and highly 
statistically  significant  impact  on  the  propensity  to  become  self employed  indicting  that  the 
opportunity cost of becoming self employed is high for high income earners deterring them from 
becoming self employed. The inverted Mills ratio is also strongly statistically significant indicating 
that it is important to control for selection bias. The inclusion of the inverted Mills ratio does not 
change the impact the average tax rate has on the propensity to become self employed, however, 
but reduces the number of observations available substantially. Overall, the effect of the average 
tax rate on the propensity to become self employed is robust across the different specifications. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is, however, rather small.    14 
The last three columns in table 3 report the results for the marginal tax rate. The marginal 
tax  rate  has  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  impact  on  the  propensity  to  become  self 
employed  in  all  three  specifications,  and  with  a  fairly  stable  magnitude.  For  the  other  control 
variables the results are very similar to those for the average tax rate. Age and age squared has a 
negative but diminishing effect on the propensity to become self employed and becoming married a 
positive impact. The negative result previously found for the level of education is now less robust. 
As before, having previously been unemployed and prior labor income is positively and negatively 
correlated with the probability of becoming self employed, respectively. Again, the inverted Mills 
ratio is highly statistically significant but has no bearing on the impact the marginal tax rate has on 
the propensity to become self employed. The magnitude of the coefficients is similar to that of the 
average tax rate. 
  Table 4 reports the results when controlling for endogeneity. Two different instruments are 
used; the synthetic average and marginal tax rates, and the average and marginal tax rate lagged 
two periods, respectively. In the first column for the two tax rates the inverted Mills ratios are 
excluded while they are included in latter columns.  
  The  coefficients  of  both  the  average  and  the  marginal  tax  rate  are negative  and  highly 
statistically significant in all specifications. For the other control variables the results are similar to 
those in Table 3, wealth is a highly important determinant that positively influence the propensity 
to  become  self employed.  As  before,  age  impacts  the  probability  to  become  self employed 
negatively but at a diminishing rate while being married affects the same probability positively. 
The effect of previous unemployment is positively and statistically significant (at least at the 10 
percent significance level) in all specifications. The amount of social benefits received two years 
previously tend to positively impact the probability to become self employed although statistically 
insignificant when including the inverted Mills ratio (and negatively for the marginal tax rate). 
Previous labor income has a negative impact on the probability of becoming self employed in all 
specifications  though  insignificant  in  one.  The  only  variables  that  are  not  robust  across 
specifications are education and the amount of social benefits received, although these tend to be 
insignificant. Again, the inverted Mills ratio is highly statistically significant but has no noticeable 
effect on the results. 
 
5. Alternative specifications and discussion   15 
The above results suggest that both average and marginal taxes matter for the decision to become 
self employed, by negatively affecting the probability to become self employed. This result is in 
stark contrast to earlier results based on mainly US data. It is, however, not surprising that the 
results deviate between Sweden and the US as the tax structure in Sweden and in the US differ in 
several  important  ways.  As  already  mentioned,  income  from  self employment  is  taxed  as 
employment income in Sweden. In the US, on the other hand, self employed individuals have the 
possibility to deduct losses against labor income while taxing gains at relatively low corporate tax 
rates (currently the lowest rate is 15 percent). Increasing the labor income tax rate, while leaving 
the corporate tax rate unchanged, provides incentives to become self employed in the US as both 
the relative gain of being taxed at the lower corporate tax rate and the value of deducting potential 
losses increase. In Sweden, however, increasing the labor income tax will not make it relatively 
more attractive to be self employed as self employed and employees are taxed uniformly. It should, 
hence, not come as a surprise that there is a positive correlation between labor income taxation and 
self employment in the US and a negative correlation in Sweden. 
  Even if self employed and employees are formally taxed uniformly in Sweden, the high 
income taxes in Sweden may provide incentives for individuals to become self employed in order 
to avoid high taxes. As self employed have greater opportunities than employees to reduce their 
taxable  income  both  legally  and  illegally,  high  taxes  may  drive  individuals  to  become  self 
employed for tax reasons. It may be reasonable to expect that individuals that are driven to become 
self employed in order to avoid taxes to a larger extent do this part time while keeping their regular 
employment. For instance, if an individual starts a business alongside her regular employment she 
can meet potential customers through her employment but perform some services through the firm 
which provides the individual with greater opportunities to affect the net return to labor. To test this 
hypothesis,  I  alternatively  investigate  how  taxes  affect  individuals  that  have  a  positive  self 
employment income but where this income is less than their income from employment. In the 
sample, slightly more then 3 percent of the individuals fulfil these conditions. 
The results from these regressions are shown in columns Ia and Ib in table 5. In the first 
column  (Ia)  the  average  tax  rate  is  employed  while  column  Ib  presents  the  results  when  the 
marginal tax rate is employed. I use the synthetic tax rate as an instrument and omit the inverted 
Mills ratio.
6 Columns Ia and Ib in table 5 should be compared to columns Ia and Ib in table 4, 
                                                 
6 Including the inverted Mills ratio does not alter the result but reduce the number of observations substantially.   16 
respectively.  Interestingly,  the  tax  rates  now  positively  impact  part time  self employment.  An 
increase in both the average and the marginal tax rate increases the probability to become self 
employed part time. This is consistent with the hypothesis that these individuals to a larger extent 
are driven to become self employed in order to avoid taxes. As previously, access to wealth is 
important.  Interestingly, age  now  have  a  positive  but  diminishing  impact  on  the  probability to 
become self employed. In addition, an increase in the level of education positively influences the 
propensity to become self employed while amounts of previously received social benefits impact 
the probability to become self employed negatively. The results from  these estimations, hence, 
indicate that factors determining individuals to become self employed part time differ from factors 
influencing individuals to become self employed as their primary occupation. 
As the propensity to become self employed may differ between men and women I also 
estimate  regression  (1)  for  men  and women separately.  The  results  from  these  estimations  are 
reported in columns II and III in table 5 for men and women, respectively. 
  The results do not show any systematic differences between men and women when it comes 
to the impact of taxes on the probability to become self employed. For women the coefficient of the 
average tax rate is, however, less significant than for men and the coefficient of the marginal tax 
rate is lower for women than men. The other control variables do not influence men and women’s 
propensity to become self employed differently either. The only difference is that previous earned 
income impact men’s propensity to become self employed negatively and statistically significant 
but have an insignificant impact on women’s probability to become self employed. 
  Another interesting issue is whether more innovative entrepreneurs or start ups are more 
sensitive to taxes than less innovative entrepreneurs or start ups. Gentry & Hubbard (2004) have 
addressed this issue based on US data, but failed to provide empirical support for it. It is not 
straightforward how to measure innovative entrepreneurs. Gentry & Hubbard used, among other 
things, education as a proxy for innovative entrepreneurs and assumed that self employed with high 
levels of education were more innovative than self employed with lower levels of education. To get 
an indication whether high educated are more sensitive to taxes in their choice of employment 
status  than  less  educated,  I  divide  my  sample  into  two  sub samples  depending  on  level  of 
education. Those with college degrees or more are assumed to have a high level of education while 
those with less than a college degree are assumed to be less educated. Determining what drives 
high educated individuals to become self employed is interesting in its own right, regardless if they   17 
are more innovative or not, especially in Sweden were high educated individuals are less likely to 
be  self employed  than  low  educated.  Indeed,  the  lack  of  academic  entrepreneurship  has  been 
pointed out as a contributing factor to why Sweden has been unsuccessful in transforming existing 
knowledge into commercialized products and economic growth (Braunerhjelm et al., 2003). 
  The results from these estimations are presented in table 6. As is apparent from the table 
taxes  affect  both  high   and  low educated  individuals’  propensity  to  become  self employed 
negatively. The magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat larger for high educated individuals 
(especially so for the marginal tax rate), however, even though the magnitudes still are small. There 
are other noteworthy differences between factors influencing high  and low educated probability to 
become self employed. Age, for instance, seems to have no impact on high educated individuals’ 
probability to become self employed while negatively impacting the probability to become self 
employed for those will lower levels of education. Likewise, marital status influences high  and 
low educated individuals differently. For low educated, being married has a positive impact on the 
probability  to  become  self employed,  while  for  high  educated  marriage  has  no  statistically 
significant impact. It is also noteworthy that previous earned income has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the propensity to become self employed for high educated individuals but an 
insignificant impact on those with lower levels of education. 
  Previous  results  indicate  that  both  the  average  and  the  marginal  tax  rate  influence  the 
probability  to  become self employed  negatively  and give  the  impression of  being  of the  same 
importance. Bruce (2000), who studies both average and marginal tax rates, found that the marginal 
tax  rate  was  of  greater  importance  for  the  decision  to  become  self employed,  however.  To 
determine if the same relation holds in Sweden, I estimate a model that includes both the average 
and the marginal tax rate. The results from this estimation (presented in table 6) indicate that the 
average tax rate is of greater importance than the marginal tax rate as the marginal tax rate has an 
insignificant impact on the propensity to become self employed when both tax rates are included.  
Previously,  I  argued  that  a  study  based  on  Swedish  conditions  is  more  appropriate  for 
analyzing  how  income  taxation  of  self employment  affects  the  probability  to  become  self 
employed as self employed and employees are taxed uniformly in Sweden. The study here is based 
on data from 1985 to 2000. Prior to the 1990/91 tax reform self employed and employees were not 
taxed  as  uniformly  as  after  the  reform,  as  self employed  had  extensive  deduction  possibilities 
making their effective tax burden lower. As the main purpose of the tax reform was to create a   18 
uniform tax system these deduction possibilities were reduced, resulting in a more uniform tax 
treatment of self employed and employees.
7 In a last sensitivity I create a sub sample including 
only years after the tax reform. This does not change the results, however. Both the average and the 
marginal tax have a negative and statistically significant impact on the propensity to become self 
employed in the post tax reform sub sample. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This  paper  studies  how  taxation  affects  the  propensity  to  become  self employed.  It  uses  a 
particularly rich data set of Swedish taxpayers, which provides detailed information about taxes, 
income, employment status and demographic variables. Previous studies – mainly based on US 
data   have generally found that taxes positively influence the decision to become self employed. 
The intuition behind this result is that the incentives to be self employed are greater when taxes are 
high as the self employed more easily can avoid taxation than employees.  
This study casts some  doubt on this result, and shows that average and marginal taxes 
negatively  influence  the  propensity  to  become  self employed  in  Sweden.  This  result  could  be 
specific to Sweden, where the tax structure is more neutral and subsidizes risk to a lesser extent 
than in the US. The result could, however, be due to the use of better data, and, hence, the capacity 
to better control for a number of confounding factors and endogeneity. It is, however, clear that it is 
not only the level of taxation but the tax structure that affect individuals’ probability to become 
self employed. 
That  Sweden  lacks  educated  self employed  is  a  problem  if  self employed  with  higher 
education  are  more  innovative  and  better  equipped  to  transform  existing  knowledge  to 
commercialized products and economic growth than self employed with lower levels of education. 
A possible reason, and consistent with results from this study, is that high taxes discourage high 
educated individuals from becoming self employed. Why leave a relatively safe life as an employee 
for an uncertain life as a self employed when the potential net returns are low and the costs if 
failing are high? 
Consistent with earlier studies access to capital (wealth) is an important determinant for 
becoming  self employed.  Taxes  that  affect  the  incentives  to  build  up  wealth,  hence,  influence 
                                                 
7 Part of the tax reform entailed a switch to a dual income tax system taxing labor income at a higher and capital 
income at a lower tax rate. In order not to create incentives for self employed to shift labor income to lower taxed 
capital income special rules, the so called 3:12 rules, were created to minimize this problem.   19 
individuals’  self employment  decisions.  Other  important  determinants  are  age,  education  and 
previous employment history. 
To make any policy implications it is important to distinguish between factors that influence 
an individual’s decision to become an “entrepreneur” from those attracted to self employment in 
order to avoid taxation, however. It is clearly the former that policy makers may want to stimulate, 
if encouragement of entrepreneurship is desirable. Specific tax relieves for small firms and start ups 
may create distortions and stimulate to the latter type of self employment. General tax reforms that, 
for  instance,  reduce  the  top  marginal  tax  rates  will  likely  have  positive  impacts  on  business 
formations and maybe stimulate high educated individuals to start businesses as well as tax policies 
that stimulate individuals to build up wealth. In addition, the loss offsetting rules must be more 
generous so that the cost of failing is reduced.   20 
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Table 1. Summery of earlier studies’ results 
Method  Author  Estimated 
effect 






+  Marginal, hypothetical 
married couple 
1963 77  USA 
  Blau (1987) 
 
+/   Marginal, high/low 
income 
1948 82  USA 
  Parker (1996)  +/+  Marginal, high/low 
income 
1959 91  UK 













1978 92  15 OECD 
  Fairlie & Meyer 
(2000) 
0  No regression  1910 90  USA 
  Briscoe m fl 
(2000) 
-  Tax law for manuf 
industry 
1970 99  UK 
  Bruce & Moshin 
(2006) 
-  Tax on income, corp 
income. estate, social 
security contrib. 
1950 99  USA 
Cross-
section 
Long (1982a)  +  Marginal  1970  USA 
  Long (1982b)  +  Marginal  1970  USA 
  Moore (1983)  +  Income and social 
security contrib. 
1978  USA 
  Parker (2003)  0  Tax on self employment  1994  UK 





Social security contrib 
1972 96  OECD 
  Fölster (2002)    
  
Tax revenues/GDP 








Schuetze (2000)  +  Federal/local average  1983 94  Canada/USA 
  Bruce (2000)  + 
  
Expected marginal and 
average 
1970 92  USA 
  Bruce (2002)    exit  Expected marginal and 
average  
1970 91  USA 
  Cullen & Gordon 
(2002) 
+  Aggregated average  1964 93  USA 





Progressivity in marginal 
tax rates  
1979 93  USA 






1978 93  USA 
  Moore (2003)     Marginal and average  1983 2001  USA 
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Table 2. Some sample characteristics for self employed and employees, respectively. 
  Self employed  Employees 
Share  4.28 %  95.72 % 
Average taxable income  131,240  179,624 
Average tax rate  33 %  35 % 
Marginal tax  37 %  41% 
Average taxable wealth  131,031  68,721 
Average age   44.2  39.9 
Average sex
1  1.29  1.49 
Marital status
2  0.65  0.52 
Average education level
3  2.85  3.53 
1 Sex equals one if the individual is a man and 2 if it is a woman. 
2 Marital status equals one if the individual is married and zero otherwise. 
3 Education takes a value between 1 and 7, where 1 is the lowest level and 7 the highest (graduate). 
Source: LINDA 
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Table 3. Probit estimation of the probability of becoming self employed  
using panel data from 1985 to 2000. 
  Ia  IIa  IIIa  Ib  IIb  IIIb 
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(0.124)* 
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     7.22 
(0.714)*** 
 
     7.54 
(0.675)*** 













N  1,035,454  729,941  257,420  1,040,573  732,180  259,472 
McFadden’s  
R squared 
0.031  0.032  0.022  0.030  0.019  0.037 
Wald ch2  2260.11  1737.54  296.98  1820.32  851.87  567.35 
Pro > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Numbers shown in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
Also include year dummies.   25 
Table 4. IV probit estimation of the probability of becoming self employed  
using panel data from 1985 to 2000. 
 
  Ia  IIa  IIIa  Ib  IIb  IIIb 
  Synt tax  Synt tax  Laggad tax   Synt tax   Synt tax  Laggad tax  
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N  855,575  301,743  255,881  860,140  305,083  259,472 
Wald chi2  385.28  147.68  176.19  423.07  209.68  282.88 
Prob>chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Numbers shown in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
Also include year dummies. 
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Table 5. IV probit estimation of the probability of becoming self employed using panel data from 1985 to 
2000 for self employed part time and for men and women (using the synthetic tax rates as instruments)  
  Self 
employed 





















   
Marginal tax 
rate 
  0.0014 
(0.0006)** 

























































































































































































N  859,981  864,978  430,753  424,822  433,055  427,085 
Wald chi2  2243.15  2310.79  433.36  156.47  613.17  137.25 
Prob>chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Numbers shown in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
Also include year dummies.   27 
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis IV probit estimation of the probability of becoming self employed  
using panel data from 1985 to 2000 for those with any business income and for men vs women (using the 
synthetic tax rates as instruments)  
 






























































































































































































































































N  246,708  608,837  248,043  612,067  854,765  688,987  691,189 
Wald chi2  211.03  243.31  229.35  213.84  362.33  302,44  321,02 
Prob>chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Numbers shown in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
Also include year dummies. 